How Often Ladders Should Be Inspected

• Pre-use checks: Under HSE guidance, carry out a short pre-use check each working day and repeat it after any change that could affect stability or grip (e.g. the ladder is dropped or knocked, moved between environments, or contamination could affect the feet) (HSE, 2024a).
• Planned inspections: Complete recorded detailed visual inspections at a frequency set by risk assessment, conditions of use, and manufacturer guidance — not habit (HSE, 2024b; HSE, 2024c).
• Post-event checks: After any event that could jeopardise safety (suspected impact damage, exceptional circumstances, major change in how it’s being used), inspect before return to service (HSE, 2024c; OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23).
• When in doubt, isolate it: If you can’t confirm it’s safe, take it out of service and resolve the defect. If reporting doesn’t trigger action, the system signals that checks don’t change anything.

The guidance on safe use of ladders from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is clear on two essentials:

• a pre-use check each working day, and
• an up-to-date record of detailed visual inspections carried out regularly by a competent person (HSE, 2024a; HSE, 2024b).

HSE’s PUWER inspection guidance adds the underlying principle: inspection scope and frequency should be determined through risk assessment, with re-inspection at suitable intervals and after every event liable to jeopardise safety (HSE, 2024c).

There is no single legally mandated inspection interval (such as “monthly” or “every three months”). Inspection frequency should be based on risk assessment, conditions of use, and manufacturer guidance. Monthly or quarterly intervals may be appropriate in some settings, but they are not the starting assumption.

UK note: If a ladder forms part of a scaffold system, it still falls under scaffold inspection requirements, including inspection at least every seven days and after events that could affect safety.

In the United States, OSHA sets minimum inspection expectations through its standards, with different requirements for General Industry and Construction.

For general industry, OSHA requires ladders to be inspected before initial use in each work shift, and more frequently as necessary to identify visible defects. Any ladder with structural or other defects must be immediately tagged “Dangerous: Do Not Use” (or similar) and removed from service until repaired or replaced (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23(b)(9)–(10)).

For construction, OSHA requires ladders to be inspected and controlled by a competent person, defined as someone capable of identifying hazards and authorised to take prompt corrective measures (OSHA, 29 CFR 1926.1053; 29 CFR 1926.32(f)).

The practical point is similar across UK and US contexts: inspection expectations are tied to how ladders are actually used and how they can deteriorate. In the US, OSHA also sets a baseline requirement for General Industry to inspect ladders before initial use in each work shift (and more frequently as necessary), while Construction requires inspection on a periodic basis and after any occurrence that could affect safe use.

In both systems, inspection only works if defects trigger real withdrawal from use.

Meeting inspection requirements is necessary for compliance, but it does not guarantee that ladder condition is being controlled in practice.

This is where most ladder inspection articles stop, but it is where most organisations struggle: not with knowing what the guidance says, but with making the regime survive real work.

These failures aren’t behavioural anomalies. They’re predictable outcomes of the system: time pressure squeezes checks; shared equipment dilutes ownership; slow defect resolution keeps damaged ladders in circulation; paperwork-heavy regimes push people toward record completion over condition control (Reason, 1997).

Rushed pre-use checks are a predictable outcome of the efficiency–thoroughness trade-off: when time pressure and task completion are prioritised, people naturally reduce the depth of checking unless the system explicitly protects time for it (Hollnagel, 2009).

What organisations often label as skipped checks are usually situational violations — shortcuts taken because procedures conflict with real-world constraints such as time pressure, workload, or impractical rules, rather than deliberate disregard for safety (Reason, Parker & Lawton, 1998).

In practice, this shows up at the exact moments you most need the check: at the start of a shift, at the first job of the day, during a call-out, or when a supervisor or customer is waiting.

Design implication: treat the pre-use check as a protected task, not a nice-to-have. Make it quick to do well, easy to repeat after changes, and socially supported. If doing the right thing creates delay or hassle, the system will drift.

When equipment is shared, responsibility becomes psychologically diluted: each user feels less personal accountability for condition and reporting. This diffusion of responsibility is a well-documented effect in human behaviour, not a training failure (Darley & Latané, 1968).

Without a named custodian or asset ownership mechanism, shared work equipment is more likely to fall between systems — defects are noticed but not acted on because no single person feels responsible for taking it out of use.

Shared ladders are also handled more: loaded into vans, moved between trades, carried through tight areas and stored wherever there is space. That extra handling increases the chance of knocks and damage, and it increases the ambiguity about who should quarantine, report, or replace.

Design implication: engineer ownership. Use an asset ID, a register, and a clear custodian role, and make quarantine a simple, expected action. If everyone can use it, everyone must be able to take it out of service without friction.

Minor damage often stays in service due to normalisation of deviance: repeated exposure to small defects that do not immediately cause harm gradually shifts perceptions of what is an acceptable condition (Vaughan, 1996).

Where defect reporting does not trigger rapid isolation, repair, or replacement, organisations accumulate known defects and informal workarounds — drifting everyday practice closer to unsafe boundaries (Rasmussen, 1997).

This is rarely a mystery. It is usually a logistics and assurance problem: replacements take time, approval is slow, there are not enough ladders to take one out of circulation, or people have learned that reporting creates delay but does not create resolution. Over time, workarounds become the normal way of operating.

Design implication: make defect resolution fast and visible. For inspection systems to be effective, quarantine needs to be real rather than symbolic. Repair or replacement pathways should be simpler than the workaround, and repeated defect types should trigger upstream fixes such as storage, transport, handling, and procurement changes.

HSE explicitly warns that inspection regimes can fail when they become overly detailed or burdensome without improving defect identification or control, increasing the likelihood of superficial tick-box inspections (HSE, 2024c).

When inspection systems measure success by completed records rather than defects identified and resolved, compliance artefacts replace safety outcomes — a known organisational failure mode in safety-critical systems (Power, 1997).

This is how regimes quietly degrade: the checklist grows, the records multiply, and ladder condition doesn’t improve — because the system is optimising for paperwork under pressure, not defect removal.

Design implication: keep inspections proportional to the risk and likely failure modes, not administrative convenience. Track defects found, quarantines completed, time-to-replacement, recurring failure patterns, and whether corrective actions reduce recurrence.

HSE states the pre-use check should be done by the person using the ladder at the beginning of the working day and after something has changed (HSE, 2024a).

OSHA similarly requires inspection before initial use in each work shift, and more frequently as necessary (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23(b)(9)).

HSE expects recorded inspections to be carried out regularly by a competent person, with scope and frequency based on risk assessment and manufacturer guidance (HSE, 2024b; HSE, 2024c).

OSHA requires inspection by a competent person and removal from service when defects are found, but does not mandate a universal ladder inspection record format.

Both UK and US guidance require inspection after any event liable to jeopardise safety, including suspected impact damage or exceptional circumstances (HSE, 2024c; OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23).

A detailed inspection should focus on the parts most likely to fail and the failure modes you actually see in your environment, following manufacturer instructions.

As a minimum, inspect for feet, stiles, rungs or steps, fixings and joints, locking mechanisms, accessories, stability devices, labels, asset ID, and signs of unauthorised modification.

Decision rule: if the ladder can’t be confirmed safe, it should be taken out of service and not put back into use until resolved (HSE, 2024b; OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23).

HSE defines competence in practical terms: having the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to know what to look at, what to look for, and what to do if a problem is found (HSE, 2024c).

OSHA defines a competent person (in construction) as someone capable of identifying hazards and authorised to take prompt corrective action (OSHA, 29 CFR 1926.32(f)).

In practice, competence means recognising realistic damage patterns, judging when an issue becomes a fault requiring action, and having the authority to remove ladders from service.

Where an inspection report is required, Schedule 7 of the Work at Height Regulations 2005 specifies the particulars that must be included. These include the identification and location of the equipment, the date and time of inspection, defects identified, actions taken or required, and the name and position of the person carrying out the inspection (Great Britain, 2005).

The purpose is to ensure inspection findings are traceable, acted upon, and available for review as part of ongoing assurance.

Under OSHA requirements, ladder inspection systems should be able to demonstrate in practice — for example through procedures, supervision, and records — that ladders are inspected at the required times and that defective ladders are immediately removed from service until repaired or replaced (OSHA 29 CFR 1910.23; OSHA 29 CFR 1926.1053).

Inspection records are therefore expected to support this control by showing which ladder was inspected, when the inspection took place, what defects were identified, and what action was taken, particularly in environments where ladders are shared, mobile, or used across multiple sites. As in the UK, records only add value where they support timely withdrawal from use and corrective action, rather than existing solely as evidence of completion.

Start with manufacturer guidance, adjust through risk assessment, and use inspection history to tune intervals. HSE explicitly notes that inspection frequency can be lengthened or shortened based on experience of deterioration (HSE, 2024c).

For General Industry, OSHA does not prescribe a fixed periodic interval, but requires inspection before initial use in each work shift and removal from service when defects are present (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23).

For Construction, OSHA requires ladders to be inspected by a competent person on a periodic basis and after any occurrence that could affect safe use, rather than at a fixed calendar interval (OSHA, 29 CFR 1926.1053).

Inspection only works if defects lead to action. Ladders must be quarantined when structural components are damaged, locking mechanisms fail, feet cannot provide reliable grip, or impact damage is suspected.

OSHA explicitly requires defective ladders to be immediately tagged and removed from service until repaired or replaced (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.23(b)(10)).

“Careful use” is not an acceptable control for a defective ladder.

If ladder inspections are expected to work reliably under pressure, the surrounding system has to be deliberately designed to support them. The following features are strongly recommended system-level controls — not regulatory requirements in themselves — that allow inspections to lead to real control of ladder condition in practice.

• Implement effective asset control: assign unique IDs to ladders, maintain a register, and make ladder status visible (for example, “in service” or “quarantined”) so defective equipment cannot quietly drift back into use.
• Ensure inspections are carried out only by competent people: define who is authorised to inspect ladders, based on knowledge, skills, and experience, and ensure they have the authority to quarantine equipment and trigger repair or replacement.
• Require inspections to be carried out at the ladder itself: design the process so inspections happen next to the equipment being checked, not retrospectively or from memory. Asset tagging (for example, QR codes on ladders) can be used to confirm the ladder inspected and reduce administrative shortcuts.
• Capture proportionate evidence of inspection quality: where appropriate, require simple evidence such as photographs of key components or defects to support inspection decisions. This reinforces inspection quality without turning checks into paperwork exercises.
• Assign clear ownership for shared ladders: nominate a custodian role so responsibility for condition, quarantine, and follow-up is explicit. Without this, responsibility predictably diffuses when equipment is shared (Darley & Latané, 1968).
• Establish inspection frequency based on how ladders are actually used: set inspection intervals using the guidance in this article, manufacturer instructions, and risk factors such as environment, transport, handling, and user numbers — rather than default calendar habits.
• Schedule inspections and verify they occur as planned: once frequencies are set, inspections must be scheduled and there must be a reliable way to confirm they have actually taken place. Missed or overdue inspections are a system failure that needs to be visible and addressed, not quietly tolerated.
• Build fast, reliable replacement pathways: remove approval, procurement, or logistics barriers that turn defect reporting into operational delay. Backlogs are a safety control failure, not just a maintenance metric.
• Design checklists to fit the task: keep them ladder-specific and focused on realistic failure modes rather than completeness for its own sake. Overbuilt checklists increase the risk of tick-box inspections (HSE, 2024c).
• Provide active assurance, not just oversight: supervisors periodically observe inspections and spot-audit ladder condition, focusing on decision quality rather than completion rates.
• Close feedback loops: analyse recurring defects and address upstream causes such as storage, transport, handling, or procurement choices, rather than repeatedly fixing the same symptoms (Rasmussen, 1997).

Human Focus provides independently approved Ladder Inspection Training focused on recognising defect patterns, making clear quarantine decisions, and knowing what action is required when problems are found.

This competence can be supported by an online ladder inspection and checklist system that helps organisations manage inspections, defect reporting, and follow-up, giving visibility over ladder condition and inspection quality.

Training alone does not make inspection regimes reliable. But when competence, asset control, and inspection quality monitoring are designed together, inspections are far more likely to remove damaged ladders from service rather than simply generate records.